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Lecture 22 - Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
Lecture 22 - Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing by Ben Pollak
"In business or personal relationships, promises and threats of good and bad behavior tomorrow may provide good incentives for good behavior today, but, to work, these promises and threats must be credible. In particular, they must come from equilibrium behavior tomorrow, and hence form part of a subgame perfect equilibrium today. We find that the grim strategy forms such an equilibrium provided that we are patient and the game has a high probability of continuing."
As one considers the multiple games being played and various paths available. To think strategically yet correctly for the game is the course pending on the path. To fight or not to fight, always fight initially as your knowledge of the opponent is nil. There is an analogy of space travel along these lines as one travels from planet to planet while the measurement may be known it is always timing.
"In business or personal relationships, promises and threats of good and bad behavior tomorrow may provide good incentives for good behavior today, but, to work, these promises and threats must be credible. In particular, they must come from equilibrium behavior tomorrow, and hence form part of a subgame perfect equilibrium today. We find that the grim strategy forms such an equilibrium provided that we are patient and the game has a high probability of continuing."
As one considers the multiple games being played and various paths available. To think strategically yet correctly for the game is the course pending on the path. To fight or not to fight, always fight initially as your knowledge of the opponent is nil. There is an analogy of space travel along these lines as one travels from planet to planet while the measurement may be known it is always timing.
